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BOOK REVIEWS
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: LAW, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES by WALTER B. CONNOLLY, JR. New York: Law Journal Press. Two Volumes. Footnotes,
table of cases, index, appendices. 1975. Pp. xxiv + 1378. $60.00 cloth.
Katheryn M. Dutenhaver*
Mrs. Boriss applies for general production work at your corporation
which manufactures window and central air conditioners. She has been
told by her husband, one of the company's employees, that jobs are
available and to see you, the personnel representative. In the initial
interview, you are reluctant to give a definitive response to Mrs. Boriss
because there is a company policy that prohibits hiring spouses of present employees. It was enacted less than five years ago because there had
been a higher rate of absenteeism among married couples, as compared
with other employees, apparently due to the fact that if one were sick
the other often stayed home. Although the no-spouse policy seems to be
neutral, you are aware that seemingly neutral policies of other companies have been found to be discriminatory. You have the responsibility
of deciding whether adhering to company policy, by refusing to hire Mrs.
Boriss, violates any existing law.'
To aid you in determining whether this or other fact situations present
potentially discriminatory employment practices, Mr. Walter B. Connolly, Jr. has written a two-volume set entitled, A Practical Guide to
Equal Employment Opportunity: Law, Principles and Practices.' Mr.
Connolly, who is labor counsel for the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, has litigated many different types of civil rights cases and counseled in a variety of employer-employee matters.
* Associate Dean for Student Affairs, Assistant Professor, DePaul University College
of Law. B.A., North Central College; J.D., DePaul University College of Law.
1. 2 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 6492 (1976). In a similar fact situation, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter referred to as EEOC] (on
March 2, 1976) found
reasonable cause to believe an employer [had] unlawfully discriminated
against the female spouse of one of its employees by refusing to hire her on the
basis of its policy against hiring the spouses of employees. There was no showing
of a business necessity for the policy and that, coupled with a showing of a
statistical pattern of hiring which disproportionately rejected females as a class,
further demonstrated employer's violation of the Act.
Id.
2. W. CONNOLLY, JR., A PRACTICAL GUIDE To EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: LAW,
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (1975) [hereinafter cited as CONNOLLY].
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A new, highly specialized field of law has developed since the enactment of the Equal Pay Act of 19631 and especially since Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended in 1972,' giving litigation powers
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "the
Commission") and expanding its jurisdiction.' As a result of the rapid
development of both case law and statutory enactments, the law in this
area is in a state of flux.' Consequently, employers have been searching
for guidelines to help them foresee acts which might be found to be
discriminatory by enforcement agencies.
In response to this demand, Mr. Connolly has attempted to aid the
in-house counselor, personnel representative, union official, plant manager, employment agency representative, or non-specialist, by providing
a single source that can be used for practical advice regarding employment discrimination law. His work includes, but is not limited to, affirmative action programs, reporting information requirements of enforcement agencies, and procedures in responding to discrimination
charges and in defending or initiating lawsuits.
The author begins by summarizing existing statutes and executive
orders as a background to various employment problems.7 He then takes
each component of personnel administration from pre-employment inquiries to seniority systems and lay off policies and discusses it in light
3. 29 U.S.C. §206(d)(i) (1963). The section provides:
No employer ... shall discriminate ... between employees on the basis of sex
by paying wages to employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs . . . which
require equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under
similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i)
a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings
by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other
factor other than sex.
Id.

4. 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (1970).
5. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(a) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(a) (1970).
6. For additional information, see S. AGID, THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION MANUAL
(1975), which is a procedural guide to Title VII litigation. The manual was prepared under
a grant from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as part of an Employment
Rights Project at Columbia Law School, New York.
7. In addition to the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
as amended, the author provides summaries of the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §621 et seq. (1970); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (Supp.
1965), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 14,303 (Supp. 1967); The National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §2000d et seq.; the century old Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. §1981
(1970); and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970).
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of case law available at the time of writing." He examines employment
discrimination law as it applies to situations involving the physically
handicapped, racial minorities, females, the aged, and religious practitioners," but concentrates most of his discussion on Title VII examples
(race, sex, national origin, and religion) and EEOC procedures."' Controversial topics, such as quotas and the use of statistical evidence in
proving discrimination, are discussed." Throughout, the author reviews
the applicable United States Supreme Court decisions, federal district
and court of appeals cases, National Labor Relations Board decisions,
and EEOC determinations in an attempt to present as many fact situations as possible so that the reader may better predict the law's requirements as they relate to his set of facts.
The book is most effective as a planning tool. The second volume is
composed entirely of forms and sample documents, which are especially
useful to the employer who must oversee employment programs. 2 There
are sample affirmative action programs, various checklists, and
examples of interrogatories and requests for admissions. '3 Copies of government guidelines and lists of miscellaneous publications also are included."
Probably the strongest feature of this work is the fact that the author
is able to explain substantive problem areas quite adequately-even
while attempting the impossible task of including every possible employment discrimination problem that has arisen or ever will arise. He
8. The reader should be aware that few cases are cited that were decided more recently
than 1973.
9. For additional materials regarding special categories, see A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW (1971); T. OEHMKE, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1974).
10. Further information may be found in A. ADAMS, TOWARD FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND THE
E.E.O.C., A STUDY OF COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964 (1972).
II. Additional information may be found in E. IDELSON, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT-A GUIDEBOOK FOR EMPLOYERS, 2 vols. (1974), available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
12. 2 A. LARSEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (1975) is a supplementary source to Mr.
Connolly's second volume.
13. In addition, see CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (1976).
14. Other EEOC publications, which are available at the EEOC Publication Unit, 2401
E. St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506, include: A DIRECTORY OF RESOURCES FOR AFFIRMATIVE RECRUITMENT (1975); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY REPORT (1973); JOB DisCRIMINATION, LAWS AND RULES YOU SHOULD KNOW (1974); JOB PATTERNS FOR MINORITIES
AND WOMEN IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY (1975) (a ten volume set covering the U.S. and nine
geographic regions); QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS CONCERNING THE EEOC GUIDELINES ON
DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEX (1975); RESOURCE MATERIALS FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY AND AFFIRMANCE ACTION

(1975);

and WHAT EMPLOYERS, UNIONS AND EMPLOY-

MENT AGENCIES SHOULD KNOW ABOUT EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

(1976).
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does this in a manner which makes the book comprehensible to the
layman as well as the lawyer. Mr. Connolly presumes no prior
knowledge on the part of the reader. For instance, his discussion of
grooming codes, which require different hair lengths for male and female
job applicants and employees, thoroughly treats a selected issue in a
manner which is understood easily by the reader.' 5 Writing in an overview fashion, he points out the issues involved. In light of the rapidly
changing case law, he wisely does not lead the reader to think that the
issues have been permanently resolved. In fact, grooming codes is a
substantive area which has changed dramatically since the writing of
this book. Recent decisions" have held that the maintenance of grooming standards for males, but not for females, does not violate Title VII.'7
However, the reader must be aware that the author's overview approach can become an over-simplification and in some instances is misleading. For example, he advises companies to prepare a counter conciliation proposal when presented with a conciliation agreement drawn up
by the EEOC,' * but his discussion of conciliation agreements consists
merely of a statement that most contain a back-pay provision and extensive reporting requirements. 9 This would lead the reader to think
that conciliation agreements are very limited in scope.2 0 At a minimum,
the reader needs to know that each agreement can be tailored to the
particular set of facts, 2' that there are commission standards for conciliating various types of charges, 22 and that generally the charging party
finally determines whether to accept the proposal.2 3 The company faced
with a conciliation proposal would find the Commerce Clearing House's
EEOC Compliance Manual24 to be an excellent source for clarification
15. 1 CONNOL.Y supra note 2, at 106 et seq.

16. See Wamsganz v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 391 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Mo. 1975), af'd, 527
F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975) in which the district court followed the Ninth, Fifth, and D.C.
Circuits.
17. The EEOC has indicated its present posture on this issue by sending charging
parties form letters stating that due to recent federal court decisions in this area, which
have found that male hair length and facial hair restrictions do not violate Title VII,
conciliations on these issues will be impossible. Accordingly, cases will be administratively
closed and right-to-sue notices will be issued so that charging parties may pursue the
matter in federal court if they so desire.
18. 1 CONNOLIY, supra note 2, at 339.
19. Id.
20. An invitation to conciliate follows an EEOC determination that there is reasonable
cause to believe that Title VII has been violated. CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL 1261
(1976).
21. Id. at 1 1224 (1976).
22. Id. at 1 7301 et seq.
2:1. Id. at
1265.
24. Id. at 1221 et seq.
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of the complexities which Connolly's treatment ignores.
The statement that word-of-mouth referrals are illegal is another example of incomplete treatment of a complex issue.2" The author limits
his discussion to referrals from a predominantly white/male work force,
possibly leading the reader to assume this would be the only fact pattern
in which word-of-mouth referrals could be found to be discriminatory.
The reader should be aware that in late 1973, the EEOC found the
practice discriminatory in a work force that was predominantly black
in that it operated to deny equal notice of existing job opportunities."6
The reader is advised to use the book as a practical guide but with
Mr. Connolly's own caveat that this area of law is constantly changing27
and therefore, one cannot rely solely on a book such as this when confronted with a specific fact situation." Already, his words have been
proven true. In June 1976, the United States Supreme Court held that
a test used to screen applicants for public employment and not shown
to be designed to discriminate, provides no basis for an inference of
purposeful discrimination simply because it has a disproportionate impact on racial minorities.29 This decision, though distinguishable as a
case involving the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause rather than a Title VII case, may nevertheless rekindle argument on the principle established by Griggs v. Duke Power Co.:"
that proof of discrimination does not require proof of intent to discriminate.' Though the impact of this most recent Supreme Court decision
cannot be assessed accurately at this time, at the very least the decision
demonstrates that the law in this area remains unsettled. Additionally,
the spouses rule referred to above"2 and the author's discussion of senior25. 1 CONNOLLY, supra note 2, at 49.
6404
26. Commission Decision No. 74-31, 2 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE
(1976).
27. See text accompanying notes 1 & 16 supra for examples of areas in the law which
have changed since the writing of Connolly's book.
28. CONNOI,LY, supra note 2, at xxiii. The most complete reference to suggest to a reader
who seeks to supplement his knowledge of employment discrimination law or who desires
to research a particular substantive problem in the area is a three-volume set, Employment Practices Guide, printed in looseleaf form and updated regularly by Commerce
Clearing House, 1-3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTIcEs GUIDE (1976). These three volumes
should be used together with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Compliance Manual, also prepared by Commerce Clearing House, CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL (1976).
30. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
31. For cases following Griggs see Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d
980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Clark v. American Marine Corp.,
304 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1969); United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D.
Ala. 1968); Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
32. See text accompanying note 1 supra.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:197

ity rules :' :' further indicate that the reader should use the book as an
introduction to a specific problem area and then update the materials
discussed.
In addition to being aware of the necessity for updating the law when
focusing on a particular problem area, the reader must be cognizant of
the fact that there are some inaccuracies in the book. The statements
that the notice of charges form does not include the name of the charging
party :4 and that there is a current EEOC policy of expanding administrative investigations" are incorrect." Furthermore, there is an interchangeable use of the terms "no probable cause" 7 and "no reasonable
cause" with reference to EEOC determinations. The proper standard is
"no reasonable cause." In the interest of precision, the reader should be
advised that contrary to the author's statement, ": the district director,
not just the EEOC, can amend a determination. Although this is usually
not done, the district director may consider amending in exceptional
cases when the respondent comes forward with significant evidence,
which there had been no prior opportunity to present."
33. The status of seniority rules which may have an adverse impact on women and
minorities remains uncertain following recent decisions by the United States Supreme
Court. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 96 S.Ct. 1251 (1976); Jersey Cent. Power &
Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), rev 'dsub. nor, EEOC v. Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co., 96 S.Ct. 2215 (1976); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d
1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2214 (1976).
34. 1 CONNOI.IY, supra note 2, at 333.
35. Id. at 420.
36. EEOC Notice Form 131, which has a February 1973 print date, does name the
Charging Party. Also of interest is the fact that a very recent change has occurred regarding notice. On August 11, 1976 the procedural regulations of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission were changed to provide that within ten days after the filing of
a charge in the appropriate Commission office, the Commission shall serve respondent a
copy of the charge by mail or in person, except when it is determined that providing a
copy of the charge would impede the law enforcement functions of the Commission. Where
a copy of the charge is not provided, the respondent will be served with the notice of the
charge within ten days after the filing of the charge. 2 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE
11 5401 (1976). Agency procedures do call for a limitation on the scope of the investigation
as the following indicates:
lAllthough the Commission can investigate broadly and examine and copy
documents related to dates of hire, job placements, promotions, seniority, wage
rates and the like . . . , it cannot go beyond the boundaries of the charge-it
may not engage in "fishing expeditions."
I CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 1 1958 (1976). Furthermore, Mr. Connolly is incorrect when he states that there are no time limitations imposed for the filing of discrimination charges tinder the Equal Pay Act., for example. See 1CONNOLLY, supra note 2, at 336.
There are time limitations. See 2 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICEs GUIDE 11,092 (1976).

37. 1 CONNOLLY, supra note 2, at 337.
38. Id. at 338.
39. 1 CCH

EMPLOYMENT

PRAcTICES

GUIDE

1

3930.196(d) (1976).
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More detrimental to the book's effectiveness than its inaccuracies is
the author's expression of bias. He suggests that the most helpful guideline to use in formulating a pre-employment application form is to determine if there is a sound business necessity for eliciting the particular
information. 0 But one wonders why this comment is followed by "Great
caution should be used because the EEOC's enforcement activities are
well-financed and are backed up with increased statutory authority.",
While the author's initial advice is sound, one would hope that his
follow-up statement is not his primary reason for giving it.
Similarly, Mr. Connolly recommends "great caution" throughout the
rules he suggests one follow when the EEOC investigator comes to
visit." For example, he suggests that the respondent representative insist on being present when employee witnesses are being interviewed
during an investigation. 3 Following Mr. Connolly's advice could backfire, because the "stonewalling" he suggests may lead the investigator
to suspect that there is more to the charge than the respondent is ac40. 1 CONNO[LY, supra note 2, at 43.
41. Id.
42. Mr. Connolly's recommended procedure includes:
When the Investigator Comes to Visit
a. Be friendly and courteous at all times. Don't argue or complain about the
unfairness of the charge. Personality as well as substance plays an important
part in the investigation.
b. Unless you have a particularly strong position and have been advised to do
so by legal counsel, don't present your case to the investigator. Let him or her
ask questions and, where possible, answer them. If you don't know the answer,
say so. Don't make up answers and don't guess.
c. Don't sign an affidavit even if the investigator requests you to do so. You
don't have to and it can be damaging in a subsequent hearing.
d. Don't provide documentation unless the investigator asks for it or unless it
is particularly helpful to your position. The agency can always subpoena whatever it wants to see at a subsequent time.
e. Have another management employee in the office with you during the investigator's interview of you and others. At least one of you should take notes as to
what is said during these interviews, as federal and state courts permit the
investigator to testify concerning admissions against interest made by the company's representatives in the course of a fair employment practice investigation.
f. Try to keep the investigator on track. For example, if he is there on a charge
concerning an alleged racially motivated discharge, don't go into facts with
respect to seniority.
g. If you run into a legal problem, seek appropriate professional help.
It should be noted that many class actions and broad EEOC lawsuits have
arisen from innocuous charges. Thus, even though a charge may appear innocuous, if improperly handled, it may be expanded into a major lawsuit.
Id. at 347-48.
43. Id. at 346.
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knowledging. The author's recommendation does not allow the investigator to operate as the neutral third party fact finder intended by Title
VII,1' but rather describes an adversary relationship between the respective representatives of the respondent and the Commission. The author's approach further assumes that the investigation will be broad and
need not be limited to the precise allegations of the formal charge.' He
asserts that the EEOC can "seldom resist inquiring into all aspects of
an employer's practices"" despite the fact that the requirement of notice to respondents precludes anything as blatant as the author suggests.
This attitude further encourages the reader to view the relationship
between the respondent and investigator as adversary and may have
very detrimental effects.
The author's discussion of what to do when faced with an EEOC
investigation should have included a more constructive suggestion. If
the respondent discovers evidence indicating that discrimination has
occurred, he should discuss the possibility of a pre-determination settlement with the Commission's representative, rather than waiting until
the Commission begins the investigation. An early settlement obviously
limits a company's potential back pay liability and, where applicable,
results in the charging party's waiver of the right to sue on the allegations of the charge, 7 thereby ending the prospect of litigation. Because
pre-determination settlements also save the backlogged local district
office the time required to do complete investigations, the district office
generally will give priority to the respondent's offer of early settlement.
In view of the above factors, the most practical advice in many cases
may well be initiation by the respondent of pre-determination settlement procedures.
When the author follows his stated "practical" approach, his book,
read and used with the above-mentioned caveats, can be a very useful
tool. However, his lengthy discussion of what he views as EEOC noncompliance with the provision of the Administrative Procedure Act is
44. The basic mission of the EEOC is the implementation and, since the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the enforcement of the equal employment opportunity provisions of the Act. This purpose is effectuated through accepting and investigating
charges of discrimination made by employees or other "affected" persons or their representatives against employers, unions, and employment agencies subject to Title VII. The
Commission is directed by the Act to attempt to obtain voluntary compliance with the
Act's requirements through conciliation, conference, or persuasion in an informal manner
after the filing of any such charge. I CCH EMPLOYMENT PRAcTICES GUIDE
1909.
45. 1 CONNOILY, supra note 2, at 345.
46. Id. at 537.
47. CCH EEOC COMPI.IANCE MANUAL 1265(b)(1976).
48. 1 CONNOLLY, supra note 2, at 385-402.
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a noteworthy contrast to what one would expect to find in a practical
guide. Similarly, he digresses on the issue of deduction of unemployment compensation from backpay19 The author following a practical
approach would note that the Commission rule established in NLRB v.
Gullet Gin Co.5" is not to deduct unemployment compensation in computing backpay. He then would move on, rather than editorializing at
length on his disagreement with the Commission on this point.
Despite these drawbacks and some editorial deficiencies,' the book
can be a useful and worthwhile investment. It characterizes the substantive issues in employment discrimination. To the lawyer or non-lawyer
who suddenly is charged with the responsibility of preventing employment discrimination practices, it provides a ready resource. The reader
gains an overview of the kinds of employment practices which have been
found to be discriminatory as well as some notion of the areas which,
although yet unlitigated, may still be determined to be discriminatory.
The books also can be effectively used as an introduction to the complexity of a particular substantive problem, often providing numerous
citations as a starting point for further research.
49. Id. at 523-26.
50. 340 U.S. 361 (1951).
51. The reader would have found more extensive indexing with thorough cross referencing most helpful in this type of material. Also, a consistent presentation of completed and
parallel citations would have been more useful. The insertion of question marks in the
place of some page numbers is an obvious defect.

